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amount of loss is a range of amounts, 
the second condition is also met and a 
loss shall be accrued. If some amount in 
the range is a better estimate of the loss 
than any other amount, that amount is 
accrued or if no one amount is a better 
estimate of the loss than the any other 
amount, the minimum amount in the 
range is accrued. This interpretation is 
effective for annual and interim periods 
beginning after October 15, 1976.
Interpretation No. 15, Translation of 
Unamortized Policy Acquisition Costs 
by a Stock Life Insurance Company, is 
an interpretation of Statement No. 8, 
Accounting for the Translation of 
Foreign Currency Transactions and 
Foreign Currency Financial 
Statements. The interpretation 
provides that such costs are to be 
translated at historical rates and that a 
stock life insurance company shall make 
a computation of a foreign subsidiary’s 
reserve deficiency in dollars after 
translation. An adjustment of the 
reserve deficiency as computed by the 
foreign subsidiary may be required. The 
interpretation is effective for all un­
amortized policy acquisition costs 
reported in financial statements for an­
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In Part I of this column, it was shown 
that the present Social Security system 
is woefully inadequate in several areas 
— including the areas of funding and 
purpose.
Since social security is on a pay-as- 
you-go basis (it is not a funded annuity 
arrangement) and because of the declin­
ing birth rate, the increasing life expec­
tancies, and earlier retirement, the fund 
is practically bankrupt, even though the 
tax has increased astronomically in the 
last twenty years. Each year $75 billion 
more is paid out than is collected. At this 
rate, the $40-billion trust fund from 
which these deficits have been financed 
will be nonexistent in 1981,1 in spite of 
new tax increases passed by the Ford 
Administration to offset the deficit. 
Furthermore, the problem is being com­
pounded by state and local governments 
pulling out of the system in favor of 
private plans. Social security is man­
datory for all workers except employees 
of the U.S. federal government, state 
and local governments, and charitable 
organizations. The federal government 
has never participated in social security 
and hundreds of other governmental 
units are now rejecting social security. 
For example, the employees of neither 
the State of Alaska nor New York City 
(since March, 1976) are participating in 
social security.2 Furthermore, those 
employees are winding up with greater 
benefits under their private plans than 
are those workers who are manditorily 
covered by social security. For example, 
if a thirty-five year old worker, making 
$ 18,500 per year, were to put the $21 per 
week social security into a plan offered 
by the Insurance Company of North 
America, the fund at age sixty-five 
would be $122,245, resulting in a pen­
sion of $1,002 per month for life, com­
pared with $366 per month for life under 
social security which costs the same.3
The huge difference can be explained, 
in part, by the welfare function, as op­
posed to the annuity function, of social 
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security. Since its inception, social 
security has been geared in favor of 
lower income workers: they receive 
much higher returns on their “con­
tributions” than do higher-paid in­
dividual workers.
The problem can be simply stated: in 
fulfilling its welfare function, social 
security violates its annuity function, 
and the reverse would also be true. 
When one considers the concepts of 
human “rights” and “fairness,” the 
problem becomes even more complex. 
Consider, for example, the effect social 
security has on women, both workers 
and housewives.
More Problems, Especially for Women
Through a maze of oversight, intent, 
and accident, most women are dis­
criminated against under the social 
security laws. Originally, the system was 
geared toward the de facto situation of 
most Americans: the husband worked 
and earned the living while the wife 
worked at home. They stayed married, 
retired together (does a housewife ever 
“retire”?) and lived on his pension. Ac­
cordingly, an added benefit equal to 
one-half the pension of the male worker 
was added for his wife. A female worker 
does not receive a pension of 150 percent 
if she is married, however, so a married 
working woman gets less coverage for 
the same contribution. If a male worker 
died, his wife received survivor’s 
benefits automatically if she was age six­
ty or had minor children in the home; a 
male whose wife died had to prove that 
more than 50 percent of his support 
came from his wife in order to collect. 
This surviving spouse inequity was 
recently struck down by the Supreme 
Court,4 but the retirement inequity is 
still in the law. Thus, two males with 
wives would receive the same benefits as 
three working women who had paid 50 
percent more in contributions.
Women in general receive smaller 
pensions than men because of their 
lower salaries. The across-the-board 
pay discrimination against women 
perpetuates the same discrimination 
during their retirement years. An ad­
ditional handicap for women arises 
when they leave the labor force to raise 
children — those years of no con­
tributions, in excess of five years, serve 
to further reduce their already scant 
pensions.
Working couples sometimes discover 
that their two pensions total less than if 
only one had worked, earning the same 
total income, because benefits are based 
on individual earnings rather than the 
combined family earnings. Some work­
ing women take a “wife’s” pension 
rather than a worker’s pension because 
the benefits are higher. It is not difficult 
to imagine how a female worker feels 
when one check arrives each month in 
her husband’s name rather than a check 
in her name and a check in his name.
Divorced non-working wives are the 
hardest hit, especially if they are over 
forty when they divorce. Unless they 
remarry or go to work, they will receive 
nothing at retirement. Recently5 a 
provision was added that if the divorced 
woman had been married twenty years, 
she would receive benefits on her ex­
husband’s account. This brings up the 
interesting possibility of a man who, at 
age sixty-five, has been married three 
times, twenty years each to two women 
and one year to his current wife. His two 
ex-wives receive pensions and he 
receives his regular 150 percent pension 
with his present wife. Who pays for all 
this? Certainly not the man whose three 
wives are receiving benefits.
Surprizingly enough, all the popular 
magazines and newspapers do not focus 
on the working women’s social security 
problems. They prefer, instead, to write 
articles like “Wives Deserve Equal 
Social Security Pay,”6 with typical 
“housewives-are-wonderful-don’t-they- 
deserve-more?” logic. No one adds to 
this argument about “rights” the crucial 
half of the equation: who is going to pay 
for it? What people “deserve” or need or 
want is very compelling, but those 
“rights” cost a great deal of money. 
Sylvia Porter7 reasonably suggests that 
husbands pay for it. Since social security 
is mandatory anyway, maybe legislators 
will decide to make “housewives 
coverage” mandatory too. In some 
foreign countries, including Germany 
and Sweden, a non-working woman can 
continue paying into social security, 
provided she has worked as a covered 
employee at some time during her life.
A partial, but inadequate, solution 
has been introduced by the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976. A working spouse can set 
up an Individual Retirement Account 
(IRA) and contribute an additional, tax 
deductible, $250 on behalf of the non­
working spouse. If the accounts are 
separate, one-half goes to each; if a joint 
account is used, each owns one-half the 
account.8 Since the usual limit is!$ 1,500 
the additional $250 is not as significant 
as is the fact that the law at least 
recognizes the problem. One can expect 
the amount to be raised in future 
sessions of the Congress.
Another typical housewife’s problem 
arises when the covered husband dies 
after the children are grown but before 
the widow reaches sixty years of age. 
The interim period can easily be twenty 
years, and the housewife will receive 
nothing. At age forty or so, the job op­
portunities for a former housewife are 
not abundant either. Any woman who 
ties her economic future to her husband 
stands to lose everything through 
divorce or death, neither of which she 
can control. Should social security take 
on this insurance function? If so, should 
it also take on the insuror function when 
a single working woman loses her job or 
business? Or what about men who lose 
jobs at middle age and cannot find a 
comparable position (not at all uncom­
mon in, say, the aerospace industry)? 
Exactly where should social security’s 
function end?
The Possibilities
There are several possible courses of 
action in regard to the rising costs of 
social security and its inequities.
One possibility is for our elected 
representatives to continue down the 
path they have traveled so far. Since 
benefits are tied to inflation, Congress 
can continue promising future benefits 
to be paid out of future non-existent 
funds. The ultimate outcome will be a 
day of reckoning in which either the 
benefits cannot be paid or the tax on 
workers increases so radically that the 
taxpayers simply cannot pay it. The 
catastrophic end result would be the 
same. Something else must be done.
Another approach would be to 
separate the annuity function and the 
welfare function. Workers would then 
simply purchase an annuity to be used at 
death, disability or retirement as they 
see fit, or upon death to be distributed to 
the qualifying heirs. The welfare func­
tion would have to be financed out of 
general revenues which would increase 
taxes. In this way, the cost of supporting 
hardship cases would be clearly stated as 
a tax, not as the disguised “contribu­
tion” it now is. If people would 
recognize that social security is a tax, a 
welfare transfer payment, a redistribu­
tion of wealth, and not a personal fund­
ed pension plan, they might very well 
recognize that demanding more benefits 
as a matter of “right” will result in a real 
out-of-pocket expense to them. The 
system never should have been double­
tied9 to inflation, and it is time people 
recognize the cost inherent in such a 
plan.
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If taxpayers want to do away with the 
annuity function and emphasize the 
welfare function, they must be prepared 
to receive a small pension if they have 
been frugal and otherwise provided for 
their retirement. Richer people would 
pay into the plan and receive no 
benefits. It is doubtful that most work­
ing middle-class people would accept 
such a plan. It might result in a national 
phobia of “live fast, love hard and spend 
everything because social security will 
pay only if you are broke.”
Another possibility is to ignore the 
welfare function and compensate with a 
negative income tax. With the passage 
of the low-income credit last year this 
approach may be the one Congress 
decides upon.
• One rather elaborate suggestion10 is 
to pair young workers, say, age 20, with 
retired people on a one-to-one basis. 
The young worker would pay in for the 
retired worker until the latter’s death, 
then the young worker could continue 
paying into an annuity for her-or 
himself. With an estimated thirty to 
thirty-five years left to pay in, the young 
worker would have time to build a nice 
pension. After two or three generations, 
all workers would be on an annuity 
basis, and the whole problem of what to 
do with the welfare function would 
presumably disappear.
Another possibility is to determine 
statistically at what age a straight pen­
sion would be more beneficial for 
workers and drop those under that age 
from social security coverage and re­
quire them to pay an equal amount into 
a private pension plan of their choice, 
rather like the existing IRA, for their 
working lives. They would lose all 
they’ve paid in to social security but 
would have a guaranteed pension, or 
lump-sum payment, at age sixty-five. 
The people over this statistically deter­
mined age would receive social security 
benefits under today’s schedule. The 
huge amounts needed to fund the older 
workers would have to be raised with a 
massive, very long-term government 
debt to be paid off out of general 
revenues over the next one or two hun­
dred years. This prohibitive cost could 
be met only over the long term. But if it 
is not done the long term does not hold 
much future for anybody, including 
workers and retirees and especially for 
women.
Small Business
To Incorporate Or Not To Incorporate
Marion C. Argo, CPA 
Tacoma, Washington
The 1976 Tax Reform Act provides 
for the continuation of reduction in cor­
porate tax rates and increase in cor­
porate surtax exemption. This brings up 
the question once again whether it is ad­
visable for the small business to be in­
corporated or to continue operating as 
a single proprietorship or a partnership.
Prior to the Tax Reduction Act of 
1975, corporate income was subject to 
22 percent normal tax on the first $25,- 
000 of net income and to 22 percent nor­
mal tax plus 26 percent surtax on net in­
come exceeding $25,000, for a total of 48 
percent on income over $25,000.
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 in­
creased the corporate surtax exemption 
from $25,000 to $50,000 and reduced the 
normal tax to 20 percent on the first 
$25,000 of taxable income. This resulted 
in a 20 percent rate of tax on the initial 
$25,000 of taxable income, a 22 percent 
rate on the next $25,000 of taxable in­
come and a 48 percent rate on taxable 
income in excess of $50,000. These tax 
reductions applied for 1975 and were ex­
tended for the first six months of 1976 
by the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975.
The 1976 Tax Reform Act extends the 
20 percent corporate tax rate on the first 
$25,000 of taxable income and the $50,- 
000 corporate surtax exemption 
through December 31, 1977.
Thus, in 1976 and 1977 and possibly 
in future years, if the reduction is ex­
tended again a corporation with yearly 
taxable income of $50,000 pays federal 
income tax of $10,500 per year. A 
married couple with $50,000 of taxable 
income pays Federal income tax of $17,­
060 less a personal exemption credit 
which is, at this income level, the greater 
of $35 per capita or $180. It must be 
mentioned that a corporation is not 
allowed to reduce its income by personal 
exemptions and itemized or standard 
deductions, nor is it allowed a personal 
exemption credit Nevertheless, the 
difference in tax is sizeable, and it would 
seem that if an individually owned 
business nets upward of, say, $35,000 
per year, incorportation should at least 
be considered.
Other advantages of the corporate 
form of business are of longer standing 
than the reduction of the tax rate, but
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